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PANEL DISCUSSION
Chairman, LAURENcE N. WOODWORTH
Chief of Staff, joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
U. S. Congress
GENERAL TOPIC: CERTAIN PROBLEM AREAS UNDER THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1964.
PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANIES, AND INTEREST ON CER-
TAIN DEFERRED PAYMENTS.
Forrest W. Brown, Jr., A. M. Pullen and Company, Richmond, Vir-
ginia.
STOCK OPTIONS
Hugh C. Stromswold, Tax Attorney, Law Department, Reynolds
Metals Company, Richmond, Virginia.
MULTIPLE SURTAX EXEMPTIONS AND THE REVENUE ACT
OF 1964
Thomas D. Terry, Attorney, Legislation and Regulations Division,
Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington
INCOME AVERAGING-REVENUE ACT OF 1964
David 0. Williams, Jr., Attorney and Branch Chief, Legislation and
Regulations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service, Washington
MR. WOODWORTH:
The 1964 Act was not supposed to be as complicated an Act as the
1962 Act, and I believe there is general agreement that that is true.
However, after this afternoon, you may question this statement. If one
were to search for the five most technical and difficult provisions in the
1964 Act, I believe the five on which there is to be a discussion this
afternoon would be selected.
The 1964 Act, as is true of all the major revenue acts, has a long
history. Its public history began on January 24, 1963, when the then
President Kennedy sent down his tax message. Congressional action
was completed on it on February 26, 1964, approximately thirteen
months later. On the one hand, it should be said that not all of this
thirteen months was spent exclusively on the 1964 Act. Numerous other
lesser bills were considered as well. On the other hand, I know that
the Treasury Department staff was considering what became the 1964
Act early in 1962, before the passage of the 1962 Revenue Act. In my
dealings with the Treasury, I found that there were many people that
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had stopped working on the 1962 Act and were working on other projects
which eventually turned up as provisions in the Revenue Act of 1964.
I don't want to take too much time because I know that you came to
hear the panelists speak on specific subjects. However, I thought I might
outline very briefly some of the procedures followed in considering a
revenue act. Since we are now discussing provisions of the 1964 Act, I
thought it might be appropriate for me to outline the procedures fol-
lowed in considering that act.
As I have already indicated to you, the act started out as ideas in
minds of the Treasury Department staff and their consultants. Various
alternative proposals were discussed and analyzed. From the standpoint
of our staff, we first became fully aware of the broad outlines of the
Treasury proposals in November and December of 1962. At that time,
we began consultation with the Treasury Department to help in the
technical implementation of the various proposals. A major portion of
the work of our staff, as Dr. Atkeson has intimated, is to help the Ways
and Means and Senate Finance Committee in working out the technical
details of the problems they consider, including the recommendations of
the Treasury Department. We believe that it is useful to the tax com-
mittees for our staff to have worked with the Treasury in advance of
their presentation. We analyze their proposals not from the standpoint
of major policy, but from the standpoint of workability of the various
proposals. This accounts for our work through much of November and
December of 1962 with the Treasury Department.
As I have already indicated to you, the President sent down his
message in January of 1963. This was followed by extended public hear-
ings before the House Committee on Ways and Means in February and
March of 1963. This, in turn, was followed by executive sessions of
the committee which, although intermittent, continued throughout much
of April and May and June, 1963. These sessions, of course, are where
much of the work of a revenue bill is done. It is here that the committee
members have the opportunity to hold frank discussions on the pro-
visions, to ask the questions which need to be asked, to have our staff
explain as best we can exactly how the various provisions would work,
to hear the Treasury point of view on the proposals, and to have our
staff explain any conflicting points of view. This is a very difficult and
hard-working period, but I believe it is a really productive period. This
is the formulative stage for a tax bill. It is during this period that it is
converted from Treasury proposals into congressional policy.
The next step was to convert the general congressional policy into
statutory language. In the case of the 1964 Act, I believe this was done
largely during July. This is accomplished in drafting sessions in the
office of the House Legislative Counsel. The participants in these sessions,
in addition to specialized tax attorneys from the House Legislative Coun-
sel's office, are members of the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal
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Revenue Taxation, the Treasury Department, and the Legislation and
Regulations Division and other units in the Internal Revenue Service.
It is our job to work out in specific statutory language what we under-
stand the congressional policy to be. By this time, it is no longer a
question of administration policy but the policy of the committee.
A draft bill prepared in these sessions then was presented to the Ways
and Means Committee, again in executive session during the month of
August. The staff then explained the draft to the committee which in
turn informed us wherein the draft did, or did not, follow the com-
mittee intent. Corrections were then made to reflect the committee views.
This is followed by preparation of the committee report which was com-
pleted on September 13. The next step was committee presentation of
the bill on the floor of the House. The floor debate occurred on Septem-
ber 24 and 25. The consideration in the House was quite brief because
the House considered tax bills under what proponents of a bill call a
closed rule and what the opponents call a gag rule.
The bill then went to the Senate and was referred to the Finance
Committee. The Finance Committee held hearings on the bill beginning
in the middle of October and lasting until December 10. This was fol-
lowed by executive sessions of the Finance Committee beginning on
December 12 and continuing, except for a short interval around Christ-
mas, until the 23rd of January.
The drafting on the Senate side which occurred next, was held under
the guidance of the Senate Legislative Counsel and was quite similar
to that on the House side.
The bill then went to the floor but the Senate floor operation was quite
different, as I am sure most of you know, because there is no closed rule
in the Senate. As a result, there was an extensive debate on the Senate
floor with various amendments being offered and a number accepted.
This Senate debate began on January 30, 1964, and ended on February
7, a relatively short period of time for a Senate floor debate on a major
tax bill.
The bill then went to conference. This time the conference between
the two houses was relatively brief. Agreement was reached and the
House accepted the conference report on February 25. The next day,
the Senate completed action on the conference report and on the same
day the President signed the bill and it became law.
Now let me turn to the topics before us today. As I have already indi-
cated to you, the topics which you are going to consider this afternoon
are relatively technical. I find that one of them falls into the category of
a liberalizing amendment and four into the category of tightening amend-
ments. I don't believe, however, that this is representative of the ratio
of the liberalizing and tightening provisions in the 1964 Act. If you take
the rate reduction in account, I suspect that there were more liberalizing
than tightening changes, at least in terms of revenue impact.
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The liberalizing amendment, of course, is the averaging amendment.
Of the tightening amendments, two of these deal with capital gains,
namely stock options, and deferred income payments. The two others
deal with corporate tax problems. One of these is the provision relating
to personal holding companies and the other is the provision relating
to multiple surtax exemptions.
The first panelist is Mr. Forrest W. Brown, Jr., who is a certified
public accountant in the firm of A. M. Pullen & Co. in Richmond,
Virginia. He is going to talk both on the personal holding company pro-
vision and also on the provision relating to interest in the case of certain
deferred payments.
MR. BROWN:
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, as the Chairman stated I have
some remarks on two subjects, personal holding companies and unstated
interest on certain deferred payment contracts.
As you know the 1964 Act contains some very far-reaching provisions
in respect to personal holding companies. The Code section taxing un-
stated interest on certain deferred payment contracts is completely new
in the 1964 Act. I suppose these provisions have nothing in common
except that they are both directed at sources of income which Congress
felt was not being completely or fairly taxed under prior law. In other
words I suppose we could say at least to some extent both of these are
loop-hole closing provisions. Congress first imposed a tax on personal
holding companies in 1934 to prevent individuals in high surtax brackets
from avoiding income tax by having investment income taxed at the low
rate applicable to corporations. The attack has been directed to closely
held corporations deriving their income generally from passive investment
or other sources which are identified with the stockholders rather than
the corporation. The tactic of the government in this attack on corpora-
tions has been to tax the undistributed income of these corporations at a
very high rate forcing the corporation to pay dividends to the stock-
holders and have it taxed in his individual return.
Now the problem here is to separate this one class of taxpayers from
all other corporations. It, therefore, becomes a matter of definition and
the definition was based on mathematical tests and the affairs of many
corporate taxpayers could be arranged to avoid the impact of these tests.
Congress apparently felt that the taxpayer was winning the game too
often here so Congress changed the rules. The tax on undistributed
income of personal holding companies is, of course, in addition to the
regular corporate tax and under prior law the undistributed income of
corporations was taxed at 75% of the first $2,000 of income and 85%
of the excess over $2,000.
With the lower rates imposed on individuals in the 1964 Act, the
personal holding company tax is also reduced. The maximum rate on
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individuals in 1965 will be 70% so Congress apparently felt that a 70%
rate would be just as effective in forcing these corporations to distribute
income to their stockholders and the rate of personal holding company
tax for 1964 and thereafter is 70%. Prior to 1964 a corporation fitted into
the definition of a personal holding company, if two conditions were
present. First, if at sometime during the last half of the year more than
50% in value of the outstanding stock was owned directly or indirectly
by not more than five individuals; and, second, if at least 80% of its
total gross income for the year was personal holding company income
as defined in the Code. In computing the stock ownership in the appli-
cation of that first rule, the rules of attribution in Section 544 of the
Code were applied. This stock ownership test has not been changed by
the 1964 Act.
For purposes of the income test, personal holding income was generally
defined as dividends, rents, annuities and other forms of passive income.
Provisions were included to exempt banks and certain finance companies
which, although they derived a major portion of their income from in-
terest, were conducting active businesses. Under prior law rents did not
constitute personal holding income if gross rent exceeded 50% of gross
income. The test of the prior law was written in terms of gross income.
Net income was not a factor. Under these provisions the corporation
could escape the classification of a personal holding company by de-
riving more than 20% of its gross income from the active conduct of a
business or by deriving more than 50% of its gross income from gross
rents. The 1964 Act introduces two new terms into the test for de-
termining the liability for personal holding companies. The new Act
gets away from this test in terms of gross income only. The first of these
terms is ordinary gross income. Ordinary gross income is defined as gross
income less capital gain. Capital gains are no longer a factor in determin-
ing classification as a personal holding company.
The second of these new terms is adjusted ordinary gross income which
is ordinary gross income with adjustments to three classes of income.
First, rents: second, oil, gas and mineral royalties; and, third, certain
interest income. For 1964 and later years a corporation will be a personal
holding company if 60% or more of adjusted gross income consists of
personal holding company income. This 60% test is substituted for the
previous 80% test and of course will require a great deal more non-
personal holding company income to shelter a given amount of personal
holding income. The change in the treatment of rental income is prob-
ably the most striking in relation to the returns which we prepare and
have contact with. No longer will gross rents in excess of 50% of gross
income provide a shelter. There is still a 50% test for rent but the test
is now applied to determine if adjusted income from rents exceeds 50%
of adjusted income. Both rents and gross income are adjusted for certain
expenses. The adjusted income from rents is gross rents less depreciation,
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amortization, property taxes, interest paid and rents paid in relation to
the property. However, these expenses do not reduce the rental income
below zero. Somewhat similar adjustments are made in oil, gas and mineral
royalties. These expenses are applied against gross rents to compute ad-
justed income from rent and the same expenses are then applied
against gross income to compute adjusted ordinary gross income. And
the resulting figures are used in the 50% test. If adjusted income from
rent exceeds 50% of adjusted ordinary gross income, then the rental
income is not personal holding company income. If the 50% test is not
met then the adjusted rental income is added to dividends, interest and
other forms of personal holding income, to ascertain if 60% of the ad-
justed ordinary income is personal holding company income. So it is
much more difficult to avoid the personal holding company classification
by generating rental income within the corporation. That test makes it
much more difficult to avoid the classification, but Congress was not satis-
fied merely with that test. The new law goes beyond this in preventing
rental income from sheltering other investment income. A new 10% test
is introduced. Even though adjusted income from rents exceeds 50%
of adjusted ordinary gross income, if other forms of personal holding
company income, the dividends, the interest, etc., exceeds 10% of ordinary
gross income then rents are still classified as personal holding company
income, unless the corporation pays the dividends to its stockholders in
an amount of at least the excess of such other personal holding income
over 10% of its ordinary gross income. That is a very confusing test.
You will note that in that 10% test the test is against ordinary gross
income not against adjusted ordinary gross income. The ordinary gross
income, as we said, is the gross income less the capital gains and the
effect of this test is that even though the corporation meets the first test,
even though its adjusted income from rents is more than 50% of its
adjusted ordinary gross income, if the corporation has a substantial
amount of interest and dividend income it is still forced to make a dis-
tribution to its stockholders to avoid the personal holding company tax.
It is still forced to distribute the excess over 10% of its ordinary gross
income.
Other changes in respect to the definition of a personal holding com-
pany involve the definition of lending and finance companies which
are excluded from the classification. As you can see from this the defi-
nition of a personal holding company will reach many corporations
which were not so classified under the prior law. The new law does create
one escape hatch for these corporations. A special provision for their
liquidation is provided, and here a new term has been introduced into
the law, the term, "would have been corporation." These "would have
been corporations" are corporations which were not personal holding
companies under the definition of the prior law but would have been a
personal holding company if the tests of the new law were applied.
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Specifically, the 1964 Act provides that new personal holding rules and
definitions will not apply to "would have been corporations" which
liquidate before 1966. Would have been corporations are defined as
those which were not personal holding companies in at least one of the
two most recent taxable years ending before February 26, 1964, but
would have been a personal holding company in such year if the 1964
law had been applied. A special provision makes it possible to liquidate
a would have been corporation with a minimum of tax to its stockholders
and this is accomplished by adding a provision to section 333 in respect
to one month liquidations. If the would have been corporation is
liquidated before January 1, 1967, in a one month liquidation and the
proper elections are made under section 333, the tax effect to a stock-
holder other than a corporation is as follows: first, the prorata portion
of the corporation's earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913, is taxed as long-term capital gain provided of course that the
stockholders held the stock more than six months. If the gain exceeds
the prorata part of the surplus and the taxpayer receives an amount
in excess of the prorata part of the surplus in cash or securities acquired
after December 31, 1962, that excess is also taxed as capital gain. Both of
these provisions are far more favorable than the general provisions of sec.
333 which result in taxing the prorata part of the surplus as a dividend
and reach back to December 31, 1953, in taxing the excess of cash and
securities over the prorata part of the surplus as capital gain. As in many
of these provisions the effective date complicates the situation consider-
ably in respect to these would have been corporations. And these provi-
sions can be summarized I think generally as follows: if the "would have
been corporation" is liquidated before 1966 the favorable provision for
liquidation applies. The unfavorable definitions and rules of the 1964
law defining a personal holding company do not apply. The corporation
determines its classification as a personal holding company under the
terms of the prior law. "Would have been corporations" which liquidate
after 1965, liquidate under the favorable liquidation provisions but will
be subject to the new rules and definitions of the 1964 Act. There is
another provision in respect to these "would have been corporations"
which had what is termed "qualified indebtedness" outstanding at De-
cember 31, 1963 and these corporations may under certain circumstances
liquidate after 1966 with the earnings after 1966 taxed as a dividend.
There is one other unfavorable provision in respect to the new law. Of
course, as we stated earlier the personal holding company taxes are im-
posed on undistributed personal holding company income and a dividend
distribution, therefore, reduces the amount of tax and generally enough
dividends would be distributed to eliminate the tax. For years prior to
1964 a distribution in liquidation was classified as a distribution in com-
puting undistributed income subject to the tax. The corporation in this
manner received a deduction for a liquidating distribution which was
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taxed to the shareholder as capital gain. This was a situation which
Congress thought needed a remedy. And of course under this section
a corporation which would otherwise be a personal holding company
would avoid the tax completely in the year in which it was liquidated.
Under the 1964 law where there is a complete liquidation within twenty-
four months after the adoption of a plan of liquidation, the corporation
will not be entitled to a dividend paid deduction unless the corporation
designates the distribution as a dividend and the shareholders treat
such amount as a dividend to the extent of that year's income. So that
the corporation can no longer match a deduction against the personal
holding company income an item that is taxed as capital gain to the
shareholder. A corporation must designate the distribution as a dividend
and the shareholder must pay ordinary income tax on it. One danger in
respect to these distributions which has not been changed in the new
law but which I think we should note is that a preferential dividend of
a personal holding company is not eligible for the dividend paid de-
duction.
The second and last subject which I have for discussion here is the
new provisions in respect to interest on certain deferred payment con-
tracts, so called unstated interest. These rules are added by new Code
section 483 and in the absence of regulations the application of these
sections in many cases is still very much in doubt. We do know that we
will have some complicated situations under this section although the
irony of it is that the committee report states that the additional revenue
generated by this provision will be negligible. The reason for the pro-
vision, of course, is the practice under previous law of the taxpayer sell-
ing a capital asset on the installment basis under a contract that makes
no specific provision for interest payment. The taxpayer may of course
have computed the interest element, included it in the sales price but did
not state it separately. He therefore, if he were selling a capital asset,
reported the full amount of gain as capital gain and no interest was taxed
as ordinary income. Conversely, the purchaser received no interest de-
duction but he may not have been hurt too badly. At least that is the
way Congress felt. He may not have been hurt too badly because he may
have bought a depreciable asset, included the full purchase price in his
tax basis and therefore received his depreciation deduction. And of course
he may have received his investment credit. Congress felt that this was
an unfair result and determined that even though the taxpayer did not
recognize any interest element when he drew the contract, the Internal
Revenue Service would recognize it for him. So this section provides that
if property is sold under a deferred payment contract which requires
payments more than one year after the date of the sale and no interest
is specified, or the interest which is specified is at an unrealistically low
rate, a part of each payment which is due more than six months from
the date of sale is to be treated as interest rather than as part of the
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sales price. The new provisions apply to payments received after 1963
or sales or exchanges occurring after June 30, 1963, except in the case
of a binding, written contract which was entered into prior to July 1,
1963. The portion of a payment which is regarded as interest under
these provisions is treated as interest for all purposes under the Code
and is treated as interest by both the buyer and the seller. Thus the seller
excludes the interest portion from his sales price and reports interest
income. And the buyer excludes the interest element from his tax basis
and claims an interest deduction. The section applies to transactions
resulting in losses as well as those resulting in gain. As in almost all
provisions there are some exceptions. The section does not apply if it
can be determined at the time of the sale that the sales price excluding
interest specified in the contract cannot exceed $3,000. The section does
not apply to the purchaser if the contract specifies carrying charges which
are deductible under sec. 163 relating to interest deductions on install-
ment purchases. The provisions do not apply to the seller if no portion
of the gain is taxed as capital gain or is gain from a sec. 1231 asset. In
other words, if all of the income is ordinary income under other pro-
visions of the Code, the section which would otherwise make interest
ordinary income would not apply to the seller. However, it does apply
to the buyer. The section does not apply to certain transfers of patents
which are considered capital assets and does not apply to those rare
cases where property is exchanged for an annuity which is dependent
upon life expectancy. If the section does apply it becomes necessary to
compute what is called in the Code total unstated interest. And total
unstated interest is defined as the excess of the total payment to which
the section applies over the present value of the payments. Regulations
will provide tables for the computation of the value of the deferred
payment. Payments due not more than six months from the date of the
sale will be regarded as having a present value of 100% of the payment.
For all those due more than six months from date of sale it will not
be necessary to compute the interest on a daily basis, the computation
will be made to the nearest date which marks the six-months interval
from the date of the sale. In cases where the future payments are in-
definite as to the time and amount and cannot be determined at the
date of sale, the determination of unstated interest is made separately
for each payment. The determination is made at the time the payment is
received taking into account the time interval between the date of sale
and the date of payment. If we can force our way through those pro-
visions and determine the total unstated interest, the unstated interest in
each payment must be determined. And the unstated interest in each
payment is computed by multiplying the payment by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the total of the unstated interest and the denom-
inator of which is the total payments due under the contract. In other
words each dollar collected will represent the same proportion of unstated
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interest regardless of the interval between the date of sale and the pay-
ment. Such a computation will have to be made for payments due under
an installment contract which does not specify any interest and the
computation will also have to be made for contracts which specify some
interest but at a rate which is determined to be unreasonably low. Under
temporary regulations which have been issued, if some interest is provided
in the contract, there will be unstated interest only if the rate provided
is less than 4% simple interest. Of course, this matter of unstated interest
becomes particularly important in a transaction which the taxpayer in-
tends to qualify as an installment sale and relates to the test of 30%
of the sales price received in the year of sale. Apparently reducing
deferred payments for unstated interest would decrease the selling price
and might disqualify the sale from the installment basis by reason of
the amount received in the year of sale. The moral to all this is to pro-
vide at least a 4% interest rate in these contracts and then we just
won't have to worry with the section. Thank you.
MR. WOODWORTH:
Thank you, Mr. Brown. I believe you will agree with me that these
are very technical provisions Mr. Brown has been discussing. I believe
it might be interesting to note that in the two provisions discussed by Mr.
Brown, the recommendations of the Treasury probably were followed
more closely by Congress than in the case of any of the other tightening
provisions that you will hear discussed this afternoon. I would say that
the recommendations of the Treasury in the case of both of these pro-
visions were adopted almost without exception. There were some minor
exceptions in the personal holding company area but the basic Treasury
proposals were retained almost exactly as presented.
You might also have noted some of these phrases that Mr. Brown used
like the "would-have-been corporation" and "unstated interest" and may
wonder how terms like these arise. When the provision on deferred pay-
ments, for example, was being considered, it was necessary to attach
some name to the payments. One suggestion was that they be referred to
as the "imputed interest" provision. However, it was decided to give
this provision a name more in accord with the accepted view, indicating
that the interest was paid, but merely not stated separately from the
other payments. In other words, the interest payment was there even
though not stated. You might also have noted from Mr. Brown's dis-
cussion this was probably the first time the words "ordinary income"
appeared in the Internal Revenue Code, although they are used with
additional adjectives. One of the problems that we have had for many
years is the fact that capital gains could be referred to rather readily,
but if a class of income was to be treated as ordinary income, it was
never thought appropriate to refer to it as "ordinary income" in the
Code. It was always considered necessary to refer to such income as
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income other than capital gain income. Now perhaps there will be more
general use of the words "ordinary income" in the Internal Revenue
Code.
The next provision you will hear discussed deals with stock options.
In this case, I believe that Congress in the 1964 Act made sizable changes
in the tax treatment of these options, but went nothing like as far as
the administration proposed. The administration, in effect, wanted the
special stock option provision deleted entirely. The Presidential message
suggests in view of the lower tax rates provided by the new bill, that
there no longer was any desirable or necessary reason for continuing any
special treatment for stock options. It suggested instead that larger salary
payments should be a more effective means of attracting and holding
corporate executives. Congress did not quite accept this view, however.
Congress still felt that stock options were important from the standpoint
of providing an incentive for the executives and also that it was important
to give the executive a stake in the business. At the same time, Congress
recognized that there had been abuse in the stock option provisions and
for that reason a series of provisions were developed to tighten the ap-
plication of the stock option provisions. Mr. Hugh C. Stromswold, at-
torney of the Law Department of Reynolds Metals Co. of Richmond,
Virginia, will tell you about these modifications. Mr. Stromswold.
MR. STROMSWOLD:
Mr. Chairman, Dr. Atkeson, ladies and gentlemen: As our Chairman
has confirmed to us, the topic is Problem Areas in the Revenue Act of
1964, and the subdivision is Stock Options. Certainly stock options are
a problem area, and not for the first time in the 1964 Act. Since 1950,
when the concept of restricted stock options was first introduced into
the Code, they have posed problems, and even before 1950 when inside
and outside the courts, the Commissioner and numerous taxpayers con-
tested bitterly the rather abstruse concept of whether options were
essentially "compensatory" or "proprietary."
A certain bias can be confessed in favor of stock options as widespread
and evidently very useful management tools, at the same time admitting
that in some areas options have acquired a fishy odor that cannot al-
ways pass an initial sniff test. The connotations may be ludicrous; a
New Yorker cartoon in a board room setting where an aging and affluent
chairman addresses his prosperous associates: "I think we must all be
congratulated for our foresight in approving these options for ourselves
and thereby insuring our corporation of our continued loyal services
for two more years."
PREVAILING CRITICISMS OF PRE-1964 OPTIONS
More serious charges were leveled against pre-1964 stock options, often
by tax technicians themselves. It was said by the more technically mind-
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ed that such options violated the recognized tax principle that bargain
purchases from an employer are basically compensatory, and the spread
between value and purchase price must be ordinary income; that capital
gains treatment of the spread between the option price and the value
at exercise was conceptually improper because no capital was at risk;
and that the technical rules were prolix, complex and arbitrary to an
extreme.
Unpleasant allegations were also asserted by some dissident share-
holders groups, who said that options were unsatisfactory incentive devices
-no one could ever demonstrate that profit levels or stock perform-
ance of option corporations was superior to non-option corporations;
that because options were in such widespread use they were self-defeating
and ineffective in attracting outside management, and in practice
were used for perpetuating an aging management having no inten-
tions of leaving with or without stock options; that consideration to
the employer was inadequate and the employment contracts largely illus-
ory since the optionees were already firmly entrenched; that such in-
vestment representations as might be required were meaningless and
often no net increase in stock ownership occurred because exercise of
the options required the sale of other stock in the same corporation;
and that if options had no unique incentive characteristics they could
only be justified as a less expensive compensatory device than cash-
entirely contrary to fact since the employer obtained no tax deductions
for compensation and obscured his true costs by burying them as capital
transactions, ultimately leading to increased pressures on earnings per
share and even constituting a substantial market depressant if large
number of options were outstanding.
And even more general attacks were based on corporate morality and
public policy: We heard that the law favored business executives as
compared to professional classes, say lawyers or even investment brokers;
that the law of restricted stock options contained no self-executing,
non-discriminatory provisions customarily included in other employees
benefit programs, such as pension and group insurance; and finally that
options simply weren't sporting-a kind of heads-I-win, tails-you-lose
lottery, or a bet on the favorite pony after the race was over.
QUALIFIED OPTIONS UNDER THE 1964 ACT
In early 1963 the Administration suggested a forthright solution to
all the foregoing difficulties: outright repeal. After much soul searching
and some wrenching testimony, Congress came up with its own solu-
tion. It rejected outright repeal because, as Ways and Means reported
in perhaps not its most incisive statement of that period, options were
incentives "to expand and improve the profit positions of the companies
involved. This is not only good for the specific businesses involved, but
also for the economy as a whole." All of which is reminiscent of that
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other trenchant statement, a Lincolnism aptly applied to stock options:
"people who like this sort of thing will find this just the sort of thing
they like."
In any event the ultimate Congressional solution was not to repeal
the old system, but to approve three systems:
-Restricted stock options were retained with certain limitations pro-
vided they had been granted (or a binding contract to grant them
had been entered into) before 1964. Thus, eventually but not now
restricted stock options will find their way to the boneyard of
discarded tax schemes.
-Employee stock purchase plans were approved, the rules resembling
those for the old restricted stock options except for the inclusion
of numerous non-discriminatory provisions.
-Qualified stock options were instituted, largely preempting the field
being vacated by restricted stock options.
Since most of the recent interest has been in the latter category of
qualified stock options, our discussion will be limited to that group.
The new statutory rules reek with numerical limitations, even more
arbitrary than those for which the old restricted stock options were
roundly criticized. First, there must be a Plan and then an Option
under the Plan. Then, take any number from ten to zero and somewhere
it fits into the scheme. Our more mathematically inclined friends tell
us that all these numbers are susceptible to arrangement in a geometric
progression and that so arranged they might make some sense. But it
is not apparent from the committee reports that this arrangement is
particularly significant, so we will start at the back and creep up, which
is a practical way of approaching anything so elusive as a qualified
stock option. Arranged in such backwards order, the numbers are:
10 Years The grant must be within ten years of the date of adoption
of the Plan or its approval by the shareholders, whichever
is earlier. No corresponding limitation was in prior law.
5 Years The maximum term of the option is five years, which com-
pares to ten years under prior law.
3 Years The minimum holding period of the stock for favorable tax
treatment is three years, which corresponds roughly to the
requirement in prior law permitting disposition of stock
within two years from the date of option grant and six
months from the date of option exercise with overlapping
periods permitted. Earlier disposition of qualified option
stock will lead to treatment of the spread as ordinary in-
come to the employee and an allowable deduction to the
employer in the year of disposition-if the employer is
fortunate enough to learn of the disposition.
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1 Year The period within which a Plan must be approved by the
shareholders is one year-before or after adoption by the
corporation.
3 Months The period within which the option must have been exer-
cised by the employee is three months following termination
of employment.
0 Days The employee must have been continuously in the employ-
ment of the granting corporation (or its subsidiary or
parent) from the date of grant to the date of exercise. This
supersedes the so-called four-day loophole under prior law
where, shareholders and employers willing, it was said that
employees might work two days at the time of grant and
two days at the time of exercise and obtain complete statu-
tory benefits.
Then there are certain percentage limitations starting at:
150% The amount of the spread to be treated as ordinary income
is 150% if a good faith but faulty attempt is made to de-
termine fair market value (the spread being the difference
between option price and fair market at date of grant).
100% The option price must be at least 100% of fair market
on the date of grant.
10% If equity capital is $1,000,000 or less an employee is eligible
for options if he does not own more than 10% of all classes
of stock.
9%, 8%, For each $200,000 increase in equity capital above $1,000,-
7%, 6%, 000, the percentage of permissible stock ownership decreases
5% by one point, with 5% the maximum permissible owner-
ship when equity capital is $2,000,000 or more. All this re-
places the provisions in prior law (widely regarded as a
placebo to a small group of willful men who happened also
to be members of the Senate Finance Committee in the
late forties and opposed all restricted stock options in prin-
ciple), which permitted 5-year-i10% options to persons
owning more than 10% of the voting stock.
Other limitations do not lend themselves to arithmetical expression.
The meaning of some of them is not entirely clear but of others it is all
too obvious. Hope for clarifying regulations before some irrevocable and
perhaps tragic decisions are made in 1964 has all but faded. As of
this December day none have as yet even been proposed.
Perhaps the most significant of the non-arithmetical provisions is the
so-called reset or more precisely the antireset rule. In prior law limited
prohibitions against reset of the option price were achieved by includ-
ing any attempted reset in a definition of a "modification" and providing
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that the option price would be based on the higher of the price at
the time of the original grant or at the time of the attempted reset or
modification. But then there was a lollipop provision-a noble monu-
ment to the persuasive power of some ancient advocate-that if the
market dropped significantly so that for twelve consecutive months the
stock value was less than 80% of market at the time of grant, the price
could be reset to the lower value and all this anti-reset nonsense would
be inapplicable. Thus nobody could get badly hurt so long as the re-
setting corporation was willing to run the risk of incurring the wrath
of any dissident outside shareholders, who having fretfully endured
sharp value decreases in their own equity holdings might not be charit-
ably inclined if a fairy godmother committee should reset the option
prices near the anticipated bottom of the market.
CANCELLATION OF RESTRICTED OPTIONS IN 1964
No longer is such convenient reset possible. Under the 1964 Act, with
one notable exception once an option has been issued it will be deemed
outstanding despite any corporate action to cancel or change the option
price; and, more important, so long as it is so deemed it must be ex-
ercised before any exercise of a subsequently issued, lower priced quali-
fied option. The notable exception is that restricted stock options appar-
ently may be terminated in 1964 and if this is done they will no longer
be deemed outstanding. Thus, although myth hath it that some regula-
tory strings might be attempted on what has been appropriately dubbed
the "too much candy for a nickel" theory, it would appear that for 26
more days (including Christmas, which is appropriate under such cir-
cumstances) cancellations of restricted stock options will remove all
such options from the realm of the outstanding.
Whether or not outstanding restricted options should be cancelled in
1964 has occasioned many moments of the most excruciating agony.
Superficially, it might seem a splendid thing to do if substantial options
are outstanding at prices significantly above current market, which
could effectively paralyze the entire stock option plan. But there are
important countervailing considerations: stock acquired under new op-
tions must now be held for at least three years, whereas that acquired
under old options could be disposed of in six months assuming the two-
year holding period for the option has already been met. This could
be a significant disadvantage, not only because the acquisition must be
financed for a much longer holding period but also because the option
holder would be precluded from all trading at any peak market prices
occurring during the additional 2-2 years for which the stock must be
held. The evaluation of all relevant consideration demands certain
clairvoyant powers quite beyond the ken of the moving parties. Another
obvious disadvantage is that if the old options were issued only a year
or so ago, their remaining term will be longer than the maximum per-
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missible term for new qualified options, and thus the old options would
again afford greater market opportunities.
PROSPECTS
All this suggests that the warm and pleasant glow commonly associated
with stock options has faded, if not indeed wholly departed. The 1964
Act cuts stock options twice and deeply: not only have the mechanical
limitations greatly reduced their appeal, but the narrowed spread be-
tween capital gains and ordinary income tax rates has further diminished
their usefulness except for highly compensated employees or the more
sensational stock appreciations. Simple arithmetic computations, where
the spread between the option price of the stock and its fair value on
date of exercise is properly treated as a non-deductible capital cost to
the employer, will disclose that for a given after-tax cost to the em-
ployer, most employees will probably do better with ordinary income
than with stock options unless the employee's compensation is approach-
ing $100,000 per year or stock appreciation is particularly large. This
result follows not only from the decreased spread between capital gain
and individual ordinary income rates, but because corporate rates have
been reduced by a maximum of 4 points whereas individual rates have
been reduced by as much as 21 points. Hence, loss of the deduction if
compensation is in the form of a stock option is now relatively more
significant to the corporation than would be loss of capital gains to
the employee if the compensation is in cash.
Of course substantial arguments remain in favor of the unique incen-
tive status of stock options, even if they may now have become generally
more costly than ordinary compensation. For 15 years the relative
merits of stock options have been debated. A moment of truth may
be at hand: if the principal attraction of stock options is the unique
incentive value of a proprietary interest in the employer, stock options
can be expected to remain an important part of the executive compen-
sation package. But if the motivation is to get maximum cash in the
employee's pocket with a minimum cost to the employer, the days of
the everywhere abounding stock option may indeed have been numbered
by the 1964 Act.
MR. WOODWORTH:
Thank you very much, Mr. Stromswold, for your views on the new
stock option provisions.
The next speaker is going to deal with a topic which in some ways is
even more complex than those you have heard up to this point: namely,
the problem of multiple corporations. This, too, is an area where the ad-
ministration initially recommended the deletion of multiple surtax ex-
emptions. While this may sound like a simple solution to the problem;
nevertheless, in proposing the deletion, they found no easy way of saying
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what groups of corporations should be treated as one. That was the big
problem.
In any event, Congress did not quite see the problem the same way
the executive branch did. Congress, in essence, decided to permit mul-
tiple groups of corporations to retain their present relative position,
but be sure that the congressional action taken in lowering the tax rate
applying to the first $25,000 did not increase the incentive to set up
multiple corporations. In other words, the idea was to leave the
companies involved essentially where they were. Thus, there was an
attempt to remove the advantage of the additional lowering of rates
for multiple corporations but essentially to leave them with whatever
advantages they previously had.
Fortunately, to discuss this provision we have Thomas Terry. He is
an attorney in the Legislation and Regulations Division in the Chief
Counsel's office of the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Terry has a vast
store of knowledge on this topic. He sat in on the drafting of this pro-
vision and was one of the chief architects of this provision. I do not
mean to saddle him with the responsibility for the form of this provision,
however. He was given a series of objectives which by themselves estab-
lished much of the format to be followed. Mr. Terry.
MR. TERRY:
INTRODUCTION
My assignment on this panel is a discussion of the provisions of the
Revenue Act of 1964 relating to multiple corporations. I am sure that
those of you who have studied the 1964 Act understand the problems I
face in trying to do justice to my subject in the time allotted, so I'll
dispense with the customary apologies and get right down to business.
There is one reservation, however, which I should make clear at the
outset-particularly in view of the distinguished audience we have to-
day. The views I express during the course of my presentation are my
own and they do not necessarily represent the position of the Acting
Commissioner, the Chief Counsel-or anybody else who is the slightest
bit important.
There are 5 provisions of the new Revenue Act which have consider-
able impact on the multiple corporate form of business organizations:
(1) The corporate rate reduction itself is obviously of vital im-
portance. When the tax cuts are fully effective in 1965, corpora-
tions will pay 22 per cent on the first $25,000 of their taxable in-
come and 48 percent on the excess.
(2) In the case of multiple corporations which are subject to
common ownership, there is a new penalty tax which increases the
22 percent rate to 28 percent.
(3) Section 1551 of the Code, which deals with the creation of
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multiple corporations for the purposes of tax avoidance, has been
"tightened".
(4) Certain multiple corporate organizations are now eligible
to elect to receive a 100-percent dividends received deduction in the
case of intercorporate dividends, instead of an 85-percent deduc-
tion.
(5) Finally, the additional 2 percent tax which formerly ap-
plied to groups of corporations joining in the filing of a consolidated
return has been repealed.
I am going to focus primarily on the first three areas, the rate reduc-
tion, the new penalty tax, and the amendment to section 1551. The
Chief Counsel, Mr. Cohen, in his remarks on the Revenue Act of 1964,
will discuss the 100-percent dividends received deduction election in
some detail. As far as the repeal of the 2-percent tax on consolidated
returns is concerned, I will mention it only briefly.
BACKGROUND
Before launching into the specific details of these new provisions,
let me review briefly the multiple corporations situation as it existed
before the 1964 Act. For many years now, our corporate income tax
structure has had a two-step graduation feature. For example, imme-
diately before the Revenue Act of 1964, a normal tax of 30 percent
was imposed on every dollar of corporate income and a surtax of 22
percent tax was imposed on corporate income in excess of $25,000.
In other words, the rate of tax applicable to corporate income not in
excess of the $25,000 "surtax exemption" was 30 percent, and the rate
applicable to corporate income in excess of $25,000 was 52 percent
(that is, the 30 percent normal tax plus the 22 percent surtax). The
legislative history of this 2-step corporate rate structure makes it quite
clear that the reason for the exemption from surtax for corporate in-
come of $25,000 and below is to provide a tax concession for small
business. However, this small business tax concession has proved to be
a stimulus for large and medium-sized businesses to split up into
multiple corporations and thereby escape the surtax on a large propor-
tion of the aggregate taxable income of the business as a whole. Tradi-
tionally, the only means available to the Revenue Service to prevent
this multiple corporation distortion of the surtax exemption were cer-
tain statutory provisions and judicially developed rules which required
a finding of tax avoidance on the part of the taxpayer. For example,
sections 269, 482, and 1551 of the Code have all been used against
multiple incorporations.
The Treasury and the Revenue Service have never been satisfied
with this situation. The multiple corporation problem, as they see it,
is strictly a matter of confining the benefits of the surtax exemption to
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the taxpayers who Congress intended to benefit. The Treasury argues
that since, insofar as the surtax exemption is concerned, "small busi-
ness" is the intended beneficiary, why should a multi-million dollar
business merely through the legal formality of organizing separate
corporations, be entitled to several dozen-or several hundred-small
business concessions (that is, several hundred surtax exemptions)? Even
if there are very substantial business reasons for separate corporations
-and, thus, the separate corporations are immune from attack on "tax
avoidance" grounds-isn't there something wrong when a small bonus
for small business is being converted into a large bonus for large
business?
PROPOSED RATE CHANGES
This, then, was the situation when the tax reduction and reform pro-
gram was being readied by the Administration for presentation to the
Congress in 1963. Furthermore, included within these tax reduction
proposals was a plan to grant even greater tax concessions to small
business than was the case under existing law. This was ultimately
achieved by reducing the 30 percent normal tax to 22 percent-a
rate reduction of approximately 27 percent-while the overall corpor-
ate rate of 52 percent was reduced to 48 percent-a rate reduction of
only 7.7 percent. In other words, the surtax exemption was to become
even more valuable ($5,500 under the old rate vs. $6,500 under the new
rates). So, if Treasury was unhappy with the multiple corporation sit-
uation before the new rate changes, it was positively mortified at the
possibilities inherent in the new rate structure.
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
It was against this background, then, that the Administration's mul-
tiple corporation recommendations were developed. Generally speaking,
it was recommended that after a 5-year transition period groups of
corporations subject to common ownership and control be treated as
a single corporation for surtax exemption purposes. That is, each such
group would receive a single surtax exemption-and thus the 22 percent
rate would apply to only $25,000 of the aggregate taxable income of
the business as a whole. If Congress had adopted this recommendation,
of course, it would have been the coup de grace in the multiple corpora-
tion area from the Treasury's point of view. Not only would the recom-
mendation have prevented the windfall which multiple corporate groups
would receive as a result of the reduction in the normal rate from 30
percent to 22 percent, but it would also have eliminated the tax ad-
vantage this form of business organization enjoyed over businesses util-
izing a single corporate structure. Congress, on the other hand, had
something else in mind. Rather than accept the "complete solution" to
the multiple corporation problem as advocated by the Treasury, the
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Ways and Means Committee developed an elective penalty tax system
which was designed only to prevent multiple corporate groups from re-
ceiving a windfall tax reduction.
STATUTORY PATTERN
Let us turn now from the legislative background to the new statu-
tory provisions. The multiple surtax exemption provisions are contained
in new sections 1561 through 1563 of the Code. Under section 1561,
the corporations which are members of a "controlled group of cor-
porations" are limited to a single $25,000 surtax exemption instead of
a separate $25,000 exemption for each corporation. This means that a
single $25,000 exemption must be allocated among the members of the
group. This-so far-is the Treasury's original proposal. However,
and this of course was not a part of the Treasury's proposal-under
section 1562 a controlled group of corporations may elect to retain
multiple surtax exemptions. If the group makes this election, each
corporation in the group must pay an "additional tax" of 6 percent
on its taxable income not in excess of $25,000. To summarize, then, the
effect of the new statute:
(1) A corporation which is not a member of a controlled group
of corporations pays 22 percent on the first $25,000 of its taxable
income and 48 percent on the remainder.
(2) In the case of a controlled group of corporations which
does not elect multiple surtax exemptions under section 1562, the
first $25,000 of the group's income will be taxed at 22 percent and
the balance at 48 percent.
(3) In the case of a controlled group of corporations which
does elect under section 1562, each corporation in the group will
pay a tax of 28 percent on the first $25,000 of its taxable income
(that is 22 percent normal tax plus the 6 percent penalty, or "ad-
ditional" tax). The balance will be taxable at 48 percent.
Obviously, the best category to be in is the "non-controlled" corpora-
tion class. If a corporation is independently owned and has taxable in-
come of $25,000, the 1964 Act produces a tax cut of 27 percent (that is,
from 30 percent to 22 percent). On the other hand, corporations which
are members of a controlled group electing multiple surtax exemptions
receive a tax cut of only 6.7 percent on this lower bracket income (that
is, from 30 percent to 28 percent). This is approximately the same per-
centage tax reduction which all corporations receive on their taxable
income in excess of $25,000 (from 52 percent to 48 percent, or a 7.7
percent reduction). It should be noted that it is not always advan-
tageous for a multiple group to elect multiple exemptions and pay the
6 percent penalty. I will cover this possibility in more detail later.
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KEY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
The key definitions and concepts which are necessary to apply the
rules contained in sections 1561 and 1562 appear in section 1563. First,
the definition of a "controlled group of corporations" is obviously of
vital importance. Basically there are two types of "controlled groups"-
parent-subsidiary and brother-sister. A parent-subsidiary controlled group
is defined in section 1563 (a) (1) as one or more chains of corporations
connected through 80-percent stock ownership with a common parent
corporation. A simple example of a parent-subsidiary controlled group
is a parent corporation owning 80 percent of the stock of a subsidiary
which in turn owns 80 percent of a sub-subsidiary. The "chain concept"
used here is similar to the technique used in section 1504 in defining
an "affiliated group" for purposes of consolidated returns. Actually, the
controlled group definition is broader, that is, it is possible for a group
of corporations to be ineligible to file consolidated returns and yet con-
stitute a "controlled group" for multiple surtax exemption purposes.
The second basic category of controlled groups is a brother-sister
group. This covers situations where one individual, estate, or trust owns
80 percent of the stock of 2 or more corporations. Although tax lawyers
and accountants have used the term "brother-sister" corporations for
years, as far as I know this is the first occasion when the concept has
been dignified by actually appearing in the statute.
ATTRIBUTION
In determining stock ownership for purposes of applying these defi-
nitions, attribution rules are applicable. In testing for parent-subsidiary
controlled groups, attribution is limited to situations where a corpora-
tion has an option to acquire the stock of another corporation. In testing
for brother-sister groups, however, a full set of attribution rules apply.
These are contained in section 1563(e). Generally speaking, these
rules cover the same type of relationships which are covered in section
318 of the Code. However, they are considerably more liberal than the
section 318 rules in several important respects. For example, back at-
tribution has been eliminated and the family attribution rules have been
liberalized. One of the more interesting liberalizations is the husband-
wife attribution rule. Under section 1563(e) (5), a husband is not
considered to own stock of a corporation owned by his wife, if the
husband does not own directly any stock in that particular corporation
and if the husband doesn't participate in the management of the wife's
corporation, among other things. I realize that some of our Revenue
Agents are pretty resourceful guys, but I somehow doubt that they
should be expected to determine whether Dad is giving Mom some
business advice in the sanctity of the bedroom, particularly in view of
the Supreme Court's recent discussion outlawing the spike-mike!
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EXCLUDED STOCK
In addition to the attribution rules which are applicable in testing
for stock ownership, there is a new concept called "excluded stock".
Under these rules certain outstanding stock of a corporation is treated
as if it were not outstanding. The effect is to "shrink" the denominator
of the fraction in testing for 80 percent stock ownership. For example,
stock in a corporation held by employees of the corporation is treated
as excluded stock if the stock, in the employee's hands, is subject to a
right of first refusal (or a similar restriction) running in favor of a
substantial corporate shareholder of the corporation. Thus, assume a
parent corporation owns 70 percent of the stock of 10 subsidiaries and
the other 30 percent of the subsidiaries' stock is owned by the manager
of each subsidiary subject to a right of first refusal running in favor
of the parent corporation. In the absence of the excluded stock rules,
the parent would own only 70 percent of the stock of each subsidiary
and the corporations would fall outside the definition of a parent-sub-
sidiary controlled group. However, after excluding the manager's stock,
the parent is treated as owning 100 percent of the stock of each of the
10 subsidiaries and the result is a parent-subsidiary controlled group.
The justification for this rule is that the stock ownership of the manager
in these situations is a transitory arrangement which typically forms a
method of compensating the employee and should not be recognized as
a true minority interest.
COMPONENT MEMBERS
Up to this point, I have used the term "member" of a controlled group
of corporations rather loosely. In fact, the only corporations which are
affected by the new provisions are corporations which are component
members of a controlled group of corporations, as defined in section
1563(b). The corporations which are component members of a con-
trolled group are determined in the following manner:
Step I-The corporations which are members of a controlled group
are determined as of December 31 by applying the stock ownership
tests I have previously described. A graphic method of expressing this
is to say a "still picture" of the stock ownership situation is taken as
of December 31.
Step I1-A corporation which is not a member of the group on the
December 31 but which has been a member for one-half or more of
the number of days in its taxable year preceding the December 31
(that is, has met the stock ownership tests for this period) is treated
as an additional member of the group on the December 31. Conversely,
a corporation which is a member of the group on the December 31
but which has not been a member for at least one-half of the number
of days in its taxable year preceding the December 31 is treated as an
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excluded member of the group on the December 31. Thus, the "still
picture" taken in Step I is modified by the "moving picture" taken in
Step II.
Step 111-Finally, certain types of corporations-generally, corpora-
tions which derive no benefit from the surtax exemption-are treated
as excluded members. For example, tax-exempt corporations and non-
resident foreign corporations.
OPERATING DETAILS
Now that we have the general statutory pattern and the key defini-
tions and concepts mastered, I would like to briefly cover several ad-
ditional points relating to the multiple surtax exemption election:
(1) The election of multiple surtax exemptions by a controlled
group under section 1562 is made with respect to a particular De-
cember 31 and may be made at anytime within the three-year
period prescribed by section 1562(e) (1). The election is to be
made in the manner prescribed by regulations. The Revenue Serv-
ice published temporary regulations in May of this year giving the
details of how an election with respect to December 31, 1963 is to
be made. These temporary rules will, in the near future, be super-
seded by permanent regulations which will, of course, cover all
phases of the new multiple corporation provisions."
(2) Once an election under section 1562 is made it remains in
effect, without renewal, until terminated in one of the ways de-
scribed in section 1562(c). Again, a termination by consent under
section 1562(c) (1) is made with respect to a particular December
31 and may be made within the 3-year period prescribed by section
1562(e)(2).
(3) Once an election is terminated, in any of the four ways
described in section 1562 (c), however, the group may not reelect
under section 1562 for 5 years. Since I have noticed some confusion
on the part of the commentators as to when this 5-year period
begins to run, let me give you a simple example. Assume a con-
trolled group makes a multiple surtax exemption election with
respect to December 31, 1964, sometime in 1965. Later, say in
1967, the group discovers that it would be better off taxwise had
the election never been made. So, the election is terminated by
'Editor's note: Proposed regulations under section 1561 through 1563 of the Code
were published in the Federal Register for February 25, 1965. The Internal
Revenue Service has recently announced that, pending issuance of final Regula-
tions, controlled groups of corporations may rely on the rules in the proposed
Regulations to elect multiple surtax exemptions under section 1562 (a) (1). See
Internal Revenue Service, Technical Information Release No. 700, dated Febru-
ary 25, 1965.
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consent with respect to December 31, 1964. The important point
is that the 5-year "waiting period" begins to run on December
31, 1964, and not in 1967 when the consents to the termination
are filed. Thus, in this example, the group could reelect multiple
exemptions with respect to December 31, 1970.
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 1551
To return to a point I made early in this presentation, the 6-percent
penalty tax system is not and does not purport to be, a complete solu-
tion to the multiple corporation problem. Congress specifically stated
in the committee reports accompanying the 1964 Act that multiple
corporate organizations electing multiple surtax exemptions under sec-
tion 1562 were not immune from attack under the tax avoidance pro-
visions of the Code. In fact, Congress strengthened the most important
weapon the Commissioner has in his multiple corporation arsenal-
section 1551. Section 1551, in general, provides that the surtax exemp-
tion of a corporation created by the transfer of property will be disal-
lowed unless it is proven that the securing of the surtax exemption was
not a major purpose of the transfer. First, section 1551 as amended,
now covers "indirect" transfers of property. Under prior law, the sec-
tion was interpreted to reach only direct transfers of property other
than money. The amendment is designed to bring within the scope
of section 1551 transfers of money to a newly created subsidiary fol-
lowed by a "buy back" of property from the transferor. Secondly, sec-
tion 1551 has been expanded to include the creation of brother-sister
corporations by five or fewer individuals.
CONCLUSION
I will conclude by making some random observations on the new
multiple corporation package:
(1) Controlled groups of corporations which have, in the aggregate,
income of $32,500 and below after 1964 will be better off apportioning
a single surtax exemption under section 1561 than if they elect multiple
exemptions under section 1562, provided that the $32,500 is divided
among the members so that no member has income over $25,000.
(2) The three-year period within which a controlled group can elect
multiple exemptions can lull you into a false sense of security. This is
particularly true in the case of parent-subsidiary controlled groups
which must weigh the advantages of a section 1562 election against the
possibility of electing the 100-percent dividends received deduction
under new section 243 (b) and the filing of a consolidated return. These
latter elections must be made long before the three-year period for
electing multiple surtax exemptions runs. Thus, you should analyze
your particular situation while you still have time to go either way.
Moreover, even in the case of a brother-sister group which can only
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choose section 1561 or 1562, if you wait and a corporation leaves the
group (for example, the stock is sold off to another person) it may be
difficult, or costly, to get its consent to the retroactive section 1562
election.
(3) Since, the Revenue Act of 1964 repeals the 2 percent penalty
tax on consolidated returns, controlled groups which qualify as affiliated
groups under section 1504 should seriously consider the possibility of
filing consolidated returns. The advice is not altogether altruistic, I
might add, because the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury are
convinced that consolidated returns produce the conceptually correct
method of measuring the income of related corporations. And, of
course, only one surtax exemption is available on a consolidated return.
(4) Obviously, objective stock ownership tests used for purposes de-
fining a controlled group of corporations-particularly the one individual
rule in the case of brother-sister groups-invite some stock ownership
manipulation for "de control" purposes. Bona fide, no strings attached
transfers of stock to a stranger (for example, your brother) of course
are above reproach. However, be very wary of agreements, express or
implied, between the purchaser or donee of this stock which, in effect,
permit the seller or donor to retain the voting power of the stock sold
or given away.2
(5) The problem which seems to be the most popular, at least in-
sofar as the commentators are concerned, is the applicability of the
multiple corporaton provisions in situations where the controlled group
of corporations includes a corporation which has elected not to be
taxed as a corporation under Subchapter S of the Code. For example,
assume an individual owns all the stock of corporations X, Y, and S
and corporation S has made the subchapter S election. X, Y, and S,
of course, are members of a brother-sister controlled group. Assume
also that the group elects multiple surtax exemptions under section
1562. X and Y will be subject to the 6-percent additional tax imposed
by section 1562 (b), but what about S? Since S obtains no benefit
from a surtax exemption (its income is not subject to the corporate
tax), from a pure policy standpoint the correct result would seem to be
that the 6-percent penalty does not apply. Morever, a careful reading
of the provisions of section 1562 which relate to the imposition of the
penalty tax, and section 1372 (b), relating to the effect of a subchapter
S election, indicate that this, in fact, is the result obtained. Section
1562(b) (2) provides that the 6-percent tax "shall be treated as im-
posed by section 11" if, for the taxable year of the corporation, a tax
is imposed by section 11 on the taxable income of the corporaton. Now
as I read section 11 and section 1372(b), a tax is technically imposed
2Editor's note: See paragraph (a) (6) of § 1.1563-1 of the proposed regula-
tions published in the Federal Register for February 25, 1965.
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on the taxable income of the subchapter S corporation by section 11,
but the tax so imposed is "forgiven" under section 1372(b). Thus,
since the 6-percent tax is treated as if imposed by section 11 both the
section 11 and the 6-percent penalty tax is rendered nonapplicable by
section 1372(b). I suspect you will find something on this in the regu-
lations.3
This concludes my prepared material. I will be very interested in any
questions you might have. Thank you for your attention.
MR. WOODWORTH:
Thank you, Mr. Terry, for that excellent presentation. Our next,
and final panelist, will discuss for us the new averaging provisions.
This is a subject as old as the graduated income tax. However, every
step that has been taken in the evolutionary process of trying to
achieve real averaging is greeted with renewed interest and this is no
exception. This is perhaps the longest single step ever taken on our
pathway towards the goal of true averaging. I would like to review
for you the history of the previous steps that have helped to bring us
to the positon attained by the 1964 Act, but our time is running short
and I do not want to impose unduly upon our speaker's time. Our
speaker is Mr. David 0. Williams, attorney and Branch Chief in the
Legislation and Regulations Division of the office of the Chief Counsel
for the Internal Revenue Service. He should feel very much at home
down here with you as he earned both his law degree and his degree
of Master of Law and Taxation from the College of William and Mary.
Mr. Williams.
MR. WILLIAMS:
Dr. Atkeson, Mr. Chairman, panel members, and members of the
conference. It is indeed a real honor for me to have been invited to
participate in this Tenth Annual Tax Conference. It is always a pleasure
for me to return to Williamsburg especially when I can visit with my
close friend and adviser, Dr. Atkeson. It is a privilege for me to be
associated with these distinguished members of the panel and our re-
nowned Chairman, Dr. Woodworth. As Dr. Woodworth has stated,
I will discuss with you the Income Averaging provisions of the Revnue
Act of 1964.
The income tax burden of taxpayers whose income is bunched in a
single taxable year, or whose income fluctuates from year to year, has
been a matter of concern to Congress and commentators on the income
tax laws for more than two decades. The combination of a progressive
rate structure 1963-20 to 91%; 1964-16 to 77%; 1965-14 to 70%)
sEditor's note: See paragraph (c) (1) of § 1.1561-1 and paragraph (b) (2) (ii)
of § 1.1563-1 of the proposed regulations published in the Federal Register for
February 25, 1965.
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and a necessary annual accounting period have combined to require
taxpayers with widely fluctuating incomes to pay far greater amounts
of income tax than taxpayers with the same total amount of income
spread evenly over the same number of years.
This inequity has been alleviated very substantially by the income
averaging provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964. These provisions were
recommended by President Kennedy in his 1963 Tax Message to Con-
gress. He recommended that an income averaging provision be enacted
to provide more equitable tax treatment for those who receive in a
single taxable year unusually large amounts of income as compared to
their average income for preceding years. In discussing the recommenda-
tion President Kennedy said:
This proposal will go beyond the narrowly confined and complex
averaging provisions of present law and will permit their elimina-
tion from the Internal Revenue Code. It will provide one formula
of general application to those with wide fluctuations in income.
This means fairer tax treatment for authors, professional artists,
actors, and athletes, as well as farmers, ranchers, fishermen, at-
torneys, architects, and others.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1964, Congress had afforded a measure
of relief in certain bunched income situations. These former averag-
ing provisions were applicable to income from specific sources. They
were:
1. Compensation from an employment;
2. Income from an invention or artistic work;
3. Income from back pay;
4. Damages from patent infringement;
5. Breach of contract; and
6. Damages for anti-trust injuries.
With a single exception, these provisions have been eliminated from the
Code. Congress did, however, allow taxpayer having compensation
from a qualifying employment to elect the former treatment of such
income. However, the compensation must arise from an employment
which began before February 6, 1963.
The averaging provisions eliminated by Congress were difficult to use.
They required a recomputation of the amount of income and the
amount of tax due for prior years as if the allocable portion of the
bunched income had actually been received in those years. Under the
1964 Act provisions, no recomputations are necessary. A tax computa-
tion is made only for the year for which a taxpayer chooses to use
the income averaging provisions.
The income averaging provisions of the 1964 Act are contained in
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sections 1301 through 1305 of the Code. They are applicable to tax-
able years beginning after December 31, 1963. They are available only
to certain "eligible individuals" who choose the benefits of the provi-
sions and who have more than $3,000 of "averagable income".
This provision is available for most kinds of ordinary income, such
as, professional fees, salaries, commissions, dividends, interest, income
from a sole proprietorship, or a partnership. Averaging is not available
for income arising from wagering transactions, or in certain cases, for
income from interests in property received by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance. In addition, income averaging is not available for long-
term capital gains.
Section 1301 of the Code (relating to limitation on tax) provides
that if an eligible individual has averagable income for the computa-
tion year, and if the amount of such income exceeds $3,000, then the
tax imposed by section 1 for the computation year which is attribut-
able to the averagable income shall be 5 times the increase in tax under
such section which would result from adding 20 percent of such income
to the sum of-
(1) 133-V3 percent of average base period income, and
(2) the amount (if any) of the average base period capital gain
net income.
Although the nomenclature used in section 1301 is novel, the funda-
mental principle is rather simple. In effect, section 1301 requires a com-
parison between the amount of an individual's income for the current
taxable year (i.e., the computation year) and his average income for
the four immediately preceding taxable years (i.e., the base period
years).
In order to make the required comparison, three basic determinations
must be made. First, an individual's average base period income must
be determined. Average base period income is the average of the tax-
able incomes, with certain adjustments, for each of an individual's 4
immediately preceding taxable years. Next, an individual's taxable in-
come for the computation year must be determined; i.e., his taxable in-
come for the current taxable year for which he chooses the benefits of
income averaging. After having made the adjustments for the current
taxable year, the resulting amount is his "adjusted taxable income."
The third determination necessary in making the comparison is the
computation of the individual's "averagable income". The amount by
which "adjusted taxable income" exceeds 133-Y3 percent of average base
period income is the individual's "averagable income" for the current
taxable year. However, if a taxpayer normally has long-term capital
gain income, but receives ordinary income in the computation year,
Congress has provided for a reduction in the amount of income subject
to averaging. This reduction is the amount by which the individual's
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average base period capital gain net income (i.e., an amount equal to 5/4
of the sum of the excess of an individual's net long-term capital gains
over his net short-term capital losses for each of his four base period
years) exceeds his capital gain net income for the computation year.
While 1964 is the first year that may be used as a computation year,
years prior to 1964 may be used as base period years. In most cases
the only adjustment an individual will have to make in using the in-
come averaging provisions is the adjustment for capital gains. In ex-
traordinary cases several adjustments will, however, be necessary.
The relative simplicity of income averaging can be illustrated by the
following example. In this example, the taxable income of the individual
does not require any adjustments. John Smith, an eligible individual, is a
salaried employee; he has never been married; and his taxable year is
the calendar year. Mr. Smith decides to take advantage of the income
averaging provisions for the taxable year 1964 since he has received
bunched income in the amount of $40,000. First, Mr. Smith computes
the average of his taxable incomes for the four taxable years preceding
1964. Since Mr. Smith had only salary income as taxable income for
the preceding four years, these same amounts of taxable income are used





$12,000--4=$3,000 (the average base period income).
Next, Mr. Smith computes his taxable income for 1964 and determines
it to be $44,000, all of which is ordinary income. Mr. Smith then com-
putes his averagable income in the following manner. First, Mr. Smith
computes the amount of his income which is not subject to averaging;
that is 133-V3 percent of $3,000 (average base period income) or $4,000.
Second, the $4,000 is subtracted from the $44,000 leaving $40,000 which
is Mr. Smith's averagable income. Since Mr. Smith's averagable income
is more than $3,000, then he is eligible to average. It is important to
note the requirement that the amount subject to averaging be in excess
of $3,000 is only a test to determine eligibility. Once eligibility has been
established, the full excess is subject to averaging.
COMPUTATION OF TAX
Since Mr. Smith's taxable income required no adjustments, his taxable
income for 1964 is divided into two segments:
(1) 133-3 percent of the average base period income $4,000-the
amount not subject to averaging; and
(2) The averagable income ($40,000).
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Using the 1964 tax tables, Mr. Smith's tax liability is computed as
follows:
(1) Tax on amount not subject to averaging ($4,000) and
the 1/5 of the averagable income ($8,000) $ 3,040
(2) Tax on 1/5 of the averagable income:
Tax from (1) = $3,040
Less tax on $4,000 740 2,300
(3) Total tax on averagable income (5x$2,300) 11,500
(4) Total tax liability ($11,500 - $740) 12,240
Tax liability without averaging 20,130
Tax saving: $7,890
If Mr. Smith's income had included such items as capital gains,
wagering income, or income attributable to gifts, bequests, devises, or
inheritances, the computation of the amount of averagable income and
of tax liability would be more complex. Let's examine the adjustments
that are necessary to the income for the computation year and to the
income of the base period years when an individual's income includes
such items.
ADJUSTED TAXABLE INCOME
Adjustments are made to the taxable income for the computation
year in the following situations. After the taxable income for the com-
putation year has been determined, it is decreased by the following
amounts:
1. Taxable income is reduced by the amount of capital gain net
income for that year. "Capital gain net income" is 50 percent
of the amount by which net long-term capital gains exceed net
short-term capital losses. Capital gain net income may never be
less than zero. The House Committe Report states that net
capital gains are excluded from the income subject to averaging
in the computation year on the grounds that such income does
not require averaging because only 50 percent of the capital gain
income is included in the tax base in any event. Moreover, the
maximum tax rate applicable to such income may never exceed
25 percent of its dollar amount.
2. Taxable income for the computation year is reduced by the excess
of wagering gains in the year over wagering losses; and also tax-
able income is reduced by certain amounts of income of owner-
employees for pension plan purposes to which penalties are ap-
plicable. The House Committee Report indicates that these
amounts are excluded from averagable income in order to prevent
them from receiving a preferred status.
3. (a) Taxable income for the computation year is further reduced
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by the net income attributable to interests in property received
by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, if (1) the amount of net
income exceeds $3,000, and (2) the interest in property was re-
ceived in the computation year or in a base period year. (If a
joint return is filed for the computation year, taxable income is
adjusted only if the sum of the net income attributable to interests
in property received by the husband and wife exceed $3,000.)
The Committee Report states that these amounts are excluded
because such income does not arise from any additional efforts
on the part of the taxpayer but merely represents a transfer
to the taxpayer of income previously received by someone else.
The term "net income" means the excess of items of gross
income attributable to such interest over the deductions properly
allocable to or chargeable against such items. However, capital
gains and losses are not taken into account for purposes of
computing net income.
(b) Income attributable to gifts, bequests, devises, or inheritances
between husband and a wife is not deducted from the taxable
income for the computation year if they file a joint return for
that year, or if one of them makes a return for that year as a
surviving spouse. Since it may, in many cases, be difficult to trace
specific income to specific property interests in gifts, bequests,
devises, or inheritances, section 1302 provides that the income
for any taxable year attributable to such an interest in property
shall be deemed to be 6 percent of the fair market value of such
property interest at the time of its receipt unless the taxpayer
establishes the actual amount of the net income.
Any adjustments made to taxable income for the computation year
to determine "adjusted taxable income" is made only for purposes of
income averaging. These adjustments have no effect, for example, on
the amount of a credit or a deduction taken into account in computing
taxable income.
BASE PERIOD INCOME
In computing base period income for a base period year, taxable
income for each base period year is increased and then decreased by
certain adjustments. In no case may base period income be less than
zero. Earned income from sources without the United States and in-
come from within United States possessions, which had previously been
excluded in computing taxable income for a base period year, must
be added to the taxable income for that year. The amount of the ad-
justment is the excess of the income from these sources over deduc-
tions properly allocable to or chargeable against such income.
Two other adjustments to taxable income of a base period year
parallel those made in the determination of adjusted taxable income for
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the computation year. Capital gain net income for the base period
is excluded. Also, if any amount of "net income" attributable to a
gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance was excluded in computing adjusted
taxable income in the computation year, then all such income is ex-
cluded in the base period year even though it is less than $3,000 in
amount.
In computing base period income, no adjustment is made to taxable
income in respect to income from wagering transactions during the base
period year.
The average base period income is determined by taking Y4 of the
sum of the base period income for the 4 base period years.
STACKING RULES
In order to determine the total tax liability for the computation year,
the income for the computation year is divided into segments. These
segments, in ascending order from the standpoint of the tax rate brackets
applicable to them, are as follows:
Segment 1. The amount of income equal to 13 3 -Y3 percent of aver-
age base period income. (The income not subject to averaging.)
Segment 2. The amount (if any) of the adjustment for capital
gains made to averagable income. (Under section 1302 (a) (2).)
Segment 3. The amount (if any) of capital gain net income for
the computation year which is less than or equal to average base period
capital gain net income.
Segment 4. Twenty percent of averagable income.
Segment 5. The amount (if any) of certain other items of income
(including, for example, amounts of income under section 1304(b) (1),
relating to gift or wagering income).
Segment 6. The amount (if any) of capital gain net income for the
computation year which exceeds average base period capital gain net
income.
Segment 7. The amount (if any) of other items of income (includ-
ing, for example, amounts of income under section 1304(f) (2), re-
lating to certain distributions to owner-employees subject to penalties).
These several segments of income will become more obvious when you
use Schedule G to make a computation of tax liability. That schedule
will be available to you in the next few weeks. To assist you, detailed
instructions are included with the schedule.
ALTERNATIVE TAX
The income averaging provisions have no substantive effect on the
computation of the alternative tax on capital gains. The alternative
tax limits a taxpayer's liability to 25 percent of the excess of his net
long-term capital gain over his short-term capital loss. This limitation
is applied by reducting the total tax, computed under the income averag-
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ing provisions, by the amount by which the tax imposed on capital gains
in the stack exceeds 25 percent of the amount of such capital gains.
INCOME AVERAGING PROVISIONS ARE ELECTIVE
The income averaging provisions are applicable only when the tax-
payer chooses to make use of them. The choice is made by completing
Schedule G and attaching it to Form 1040 for the taxable year. An
eligible individual may choose to compute his tax under the income
averaging provisions at any time prior to the expiration of the period
prescribed for filing a claim for a credit or refund for the year for which
the tax is to be computed under the averaging provisions. You may
also change your choice at any time within that period.
SUBSEQUENT ELIGIBILITY OR INELIGIBILITY
It is possible for a taxpayer who has chosen the benefits of income
averaging for a taxable year to subsequently become ineligible for such
benefits for such year. For example, if the taxpayer has a net operating
loss in a taxable year subsequent to a taxable year in which he chose
the benefits of income averaging, and if the carryback of the net operat-
ing loss reduces his income for the taxable year for which he made such
choice, so that he is no longer eligible under section 1301 to choose the
benefits of income averaging, then such taxpayer must recompute his
tax liability for that year as if he had not originally chosen to average
his income.
The carryback of a net operating loss may also serve to provide a
taxpayer with an opportunity he did not previously have to use income
averaging. For example, the carryback of such loss may reduce a tax-
payer's average base period income so much that he becomes eligible to
choose the benefits of income averaging for a taxable year for which
he was not previously eligible to make such choice.
INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE FOR AVERAGING
Only eligible individuals may chose the benefits of income averaging.
Section 1303 defines the term "eligible individual". It provides that an
individual must meet a citizenship or residence test, and a support test.
First, no individual is eligible for averaging if he was a non-resident
alien in any of the four base period years or in the computation year.
To be eligible an individual must be a citizen or resident of the United
States for the computation year, and all of his base period years. If
a husband and wife make a joint return for a taxable year, both in-
dividuals must satisfy the citizenship or residence requirements.
In order to meet the support test, an individual (and his spouse)
must have furnished at least one-half of his support in each of the base
period years. However, there are three exceptions to the support rule.
(1) "Child Bride Rule". If a husband and wife make a joint return
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and the wife has earned less than 25 percent of the income properly re-
portable on that return, the wife need not have supported herself dur-
ing the 4 base period years.
(2) "The Student Rule". The support test does not apply if the
individual was not a full-time student during at least four taxable
years (including the computation year) after the individual attained
age 21. Thus, under this exception averaging is available to anyone
age 25 or older who was not a student for any four preceding taxable
years.
(3) "Kid Genius Rule". The support requirement does not apply if
more than one-half of the individual's taxable income for the computa-
tion year is attributable to work performed by him in substantial part
during two or more of his base period years. This exception will be
beneficial, for example, to youthful inventors or novelists.
MARITAL STATUS RULES
As has been previously pointed out, the amount of an individual's
income for the computation year must reflect a comparison between his
income for that year and his average income for his 4 base period
years. If an individual is unmarried during the base period years and
in the computation year no problems arise in making the required com-
parison of income. Also, where a husband and wife who are married
to each other for the entire 5-year period and make a joint return for
the computation year and each of their base period years, no comparison
problems arise. If a husband and wife make a joint return for the com-
putation year and were both previously unmarried, or were married to
each other but filed separate returns for any base period year, their
separate base period incomes for such base period year must be com-
bined to achieve the required comparison between their aggregate in-
come for the computation year and their aggregate income for the base
period year in question.
If an individual is (1) unmarried for his computation year but was
married for any base period year, or (2) is married for his computation
year but was married to a different spouse for any base period year, or
(3) is filing a return as a surviving spouse for the computation year but
was married to another spouse during any base period year, then the
rules in section 1304 (relating to "minimum base period income") apply.
Under these rules an individual must take into account as his base
period income for the base period year in question, the largest of the
following amounts:
1. The base period income resulting solely from his own income
and deductions for such year; or
2. An amount equal to 50 percent of the aggregate base period
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income resulting from the combined income and deductions of him-
self and the person who is his spouse in the computation year; or
3. An amount equal to 50 percent of the aggregate base period
income resulting from the combined income and deductions of him-
self and the individual who was his spouse in the relevant base
period year.
For any such base period year, section 1304 provides that an individual's
"minimum base period capital gain net income" for that year shall not
be less than 50% of the sum of his capital gain net income for that year
and that of the individual with whom he combines his separate income
and deductions.
Section 1304(c) does not resolve a number of technical problems
arising in the computation of an individual's separate income and deduc-
tions. These difficulties will be worked out in the proposed regulations.
Of course, any comments you have concerning the proposed rules will
be welcomed.
PROVISIONS OF THE CODE INAPPLICABLE IF
INCOME AVERAGING IS CHOSEN
If a taxpayer chooses the benefits of income averaging for any tax-
able year, the following provisions of the Code will not apply for that
year.
1. Section 3 (relating to optional tax if adjusted gross income is less
than $5,000) ;
2. Section 72(n) (2) (relating to limitation of tax in case of certain
distributions with respect to contributions by self-employed individuals);
3. Section 911 (relating to income from sources without the United
States); and
4. Section 931, and following (relating to income from sources with-
in possessions of the United States). However, if the individuals sub-
sequently becomes ineligible for income averaging, these above-mentioned
provisions will be applicable in recomputing his tax liability.
This is the end of my formal presentation on income averaging. I
welcome any questions that you might have at the conclusion of the
program.
MR. WOODWORTH:
Thank you, Mr. Williams. That brings us to the close of our formal
presentation. On behalf of the panel, I want to thank you for the
reception that you have accorded us; and, if I may, on your behalf I want
to thank our panelists for a job well done. This has been a very fine
experience for me and I am grateful for the privilege of having worked
with such an able panel and with such a splendid audience.

